The Marin Institute Takes On Big Alcohol and Wins!

In September 2006, San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) board of directors voted to reverse their previous decision prohibiting alcohol advertising on BART buses and trains. Following this announcement, alcohol industry watchdog, The Marin Institute, took quick action and launched a campaign to get BART to reinstate the ban. The Marin Institute noted that while BART officials pointed to the increased revenues that would be associated with the alcohol ads, they neglected to mention that allowing such ads would further expose young people to alcohol industry marketing.

Two recent studies have noted that alcohol industry advertising has a strong effect on youth and contributes to underage drinking. In January of 2006, the American Medical Association’s Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine published a study by Snyder et al which found that the number of alcohol ads viewed was positively associated with the amount of alcohol consumed by youth. Each advertisement viewed raised the number of drinks consumed by 1%.

In December of 2006, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) released a statement expressing serious concern about the effects of corporate marketing on youth. The AAP noted that youth view an estimated 40,000 advertisements per year and that exposure to advertising from the food, beverage, tobacco, and alcohol industries may significantly contribute to obesity, poor nutrition, alcohol, and tobacco use in young people. According to the AAP, youth spend an estimated $180 billion per year and influence an additional $200 billion of their parents’ spending per year. As a result, advertisers consider young people to be an important market and seek new and creative ways to reach them. With regard to alcohol, the AAP argued that with $5.7 billion spent per year on advertising and promotion, and an estimated 2,000 beer and wine commercials viewed annually, exposure to alcohol industry advertising “represents a significant risk factor” for youth. Referring to the fact that minority neighborhoods have five times the number of alcohol billboards as do white neighborhoods, the AAP further noted that youth of color may be particularly at risk.

Pointing to the risks for youth associated with alcohol industry marketing, on December 7, 2006 the Marin Institute and Bay Area community leaders came out to oppose BART’s decision. Because of the strength of their coalition and the size of their turnout, the BART board of directors reversed its decision to allow alcohol advertising on Bay Area buses and trains.

After their victory with BART, the Marin Institute continued to address outdoor alcohol advertising in San Francisco. In January of this year, the organization issued a report stating that CBS Outdoor, the nation’s largest outdoor advertiser and owner of outdoor advertising space in San Francisco, had blatantly disregarded voluntary alcohol advertising codes as well as its contract with the City’s Municipal Transportation Agency (MUNI) by placing alcohol advertisements near schools. The Marin Institute surveyed three of San Francisco’s school districts and found 15 alcohol ads on public transit shelters. Ads were also found near playgrounds and churches.

The Marin Institute stated in the report, “Extrapolating to the entire city (all 11 districts), we conservatively estimate that at least 55 ads are in direct violation of the CBS Outdoor and MTA contract. Furthermore, we conservatively estimate at least 81 violations of both contract and national standards city wide.”

The Marin Institute held a press conference calling on CBS Outdoor to immediately remove the ads and for the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Authority to enforce the terms of the contract. Shortly afterward, the offending ads were removed. In addition, MUNI pledged to disallow alcohol advertising in future contracts.

Between their successful BART and MUNI campaigns, the Marin Institute has managed to keep the Bay Area completely free of outdoor alcohol advertising on public transportation. Not only will their efforts significantly reduce the amount of such advertising youth are exposed to, but they demonstrate that community campaign pressure on public officials, advertisers, and corporations can lead to victories that protect public health.

The Big Apple Just Got Leaner – New York City Bans Trans Fats in Restaurants

On December 5, 2006, the New York City Board of Health voted to ban the use of almost all artificial trans fat in the city’s more than 11,000 restaurants and fast food outlets. Harold Goldstein, the executive director of the California Center for Public Health Advocacy, told the New York Times that, “New York City has set a national standard” and already several cities and states have introduced similar legislation.

On December 5, 2006, the New York City Board of Health voted to ban the use of almost all artificial trans fat in the city’s more than 11,000 restaurants and fast food outlets. Harold Goldstein, the executive director of the California Center for Public Health Advocacy, told the New York Times that, “New York City has set a national standard” and already several cities and states have introduced similar legislation.How did New York City decide to act on trans fats and what are the lessons for health advocates engaged in other efforts to control corporate practices that harm health? First, some background: trans fats are used to enhance the crispness, stability, flavor and shelf life of many processed foods. Trans fats provide food companies with flexibility in food storage and preparation, thus contributing to profitability. By the late 1990s, about 40% of US supermarket products contained trans fats, showing how pervasive exposure was to the public at large.

In 1994, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), a national advocacy organization, petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to require that food manufacturers label the trans fat content of their food products. The petition was based on research showing that replacing trans fat with healthier oils could prevent between 30,000 and 100,000 premature cardiovascular deaths in the United States each year. Some researchers have suggested that replacing trans fats with healthier alternatives could also significantly reduce the incidence of Type 2 diabetes in the US.

In 1999, despite the opposition of the food industry, the FDA proposed to include the trans fat content of food on the standard food label. The agency claimed that strengthening food labeling was likely to yield significant health and economic benefits, including saving up to 5,600 lives and $8 billion a year.1 Three years later, the Institute of Medicine concluded that they could not determine a healthful limit of trans fat and urged action to reduce its presence in the American diet.2 In January 2006, the FDA rule requiring food labels to include information on trans fats went into effect, but the FDA has turned down requests to ban the product altogether.

New York City took on trans fat in 2005. According to the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) Health Commissioner Thomas R. Frieden, “New Yorkers are consuming a hazardous artificial substance without their knowledge or consent. Trans fat causes heart disease. Like lead in paint, artificial trans fat is invisible and dangerous, and it can be replaced. While it may take some effort, restaurants can replace trans fat without changing the taste or cost of food. No one will miss it when it is gone.”

The department began its efforts with a year long education campaign to help restaurants voluntarily reduce trans fats. However, a survey before and after this voluntary educational campaign showed that overall use of trans fat did not decline at all. As a result, the Commissioner proposed the ban. Speaking on behalf of the ban, Dr. Walter Willett, Chair of the Department of Nutrition at the Harvard School of Public health noted, “If New Yorkers replace all sources of artificial trans fat, by even the most conservative estimates, at least 500 deaths from heart disease would be prevented each year in New York City — more than the number of people killed annually in motor vehicle crashes. Based on long term studies, the number of preventable deaths may be many times higher. Trans fat from partially hydrogenated vegetable oil is a toxic substance that does not belong in food.”

Some in the food industry supported the ban. Carnegie Deli owner Sanford Levine said, “We’ve been using 100% canola oil for 20 years because it has a better taste and is better for customers. It’s easy to replace artificial trans fat, it costs the same, and the food tastes great. Our cakes and other baked goods are already trans fat free. If we can do it, so can other restaurants.”

But others in the food and restaurant industry vigorously opposed the ban. Although no New Yorker ever walked into a restaurant to order a portion of trans fat, some argued that the ban would interfere with New Yorkers’ freedom. In an op-ed in the Daily News, Richard Berman, a food lobbyist and executive director of the Center for Consumer Freedom wrote, “the proposal to eradicate all artificial trans fats from every restaurant in the city is nothing short of hysterical.” It subjects the restaurant industry to a terrible case of regulatory whiplash. “If they can declare New York City a trans fat free nanny state by bureaucratic fiat, what can’t Commissioner Thomas Frieden and his minions ban?.. Maybe the radical solution is to let consumers not bureaucrats dictate what restaurants do.

In the months leading up to the vote, dozens of New Yorkers wrote impassioned letters to the editor on the subject, newspaper editorial boards took opposing sides on the issue, and hundreds of New Yorkers submitted documents or testified at public hearings on the subject.

In the proposal approved in December, the Board of Health made some concessions to the food industry, extending the time restaurants had to comply with the new rules. In the weeks and months following the New York City debate on phasing out artificial trans fat, several national companies announced their intention to eliminate trans fat from some or all of their product lines. These included KFC, Red Lobster, Olive Garden, Crisco, and Starbucks.

Lessons Learned for Changing Corporate Practices that Harm Health

So what lessons does New York City’s ban on trans fat in restaurants offer for public health professionals and advocates concerned about protecting the public against harmful corporate practices?

Local health departments can play a leading role in challenging harmful corporate practices. The campaign to phase out artificial trans fats was initiated and led by the local health department, which defined its mission as protecting the health of the public against significant threats. While advocates, researchers and health professionals played important supporting roles, the success of the effort depended on a Mayor and Health Commissioner who made public health a priority and were willing to engage in some battles to achieve their goals. Similar efforts in other jurisdictions to control smoking, restrict access to handguns, and reduce exposure to lead paint show the important role local officials can play in protecting public health against health damaging corporate practices.

Voluntary educational campaigns may be a useful starting point.

The health department was able to win over public support for the phase out in part because they first tried a voluntary campaign and were able to demonstrate that this effort was not sufficient to achieve desired public health goals. In some cases, voluntary educational campaigns may work, but beginning with this activity may help to mobilize support for stronger action should it fail.

Framing the issue as protecting people against involuntary threats helps to mobilize people. In the health department’s aggressive media campaign to win support for the proposal to phase out artificial trans fat, spokespeople emphasized that New Yorkers did not choose to eat trans fat. Since the product was neither labeled nor disclosed, the argument that consumers were choosing this product was harder to make. Comparing trans fat to lead paint and labeling it a toxic product was also a clever strategy, since New Yorkers had debated regulation of lead paint for more than 20 years and most New Yorkers understood and strongly supported government action to protect children against lead paint poisoning. Thus, framing policy debates in local terms may help to generate support.

Creating controversy can help to advance public health.

Debate about trans fat received extensive coverage in local newspapers, television and other media for several weeks. While food industry defenders and some libertarians opposed the proposal, many New Yorkers supported it. In the course of the debate, the topic changed from whether to ban trans fat to how best to do it and on what timetable. The conflict provoked discussion and engaged diverse constituencies in the issue.

Some public health professionals have a predictable approach to conflict: partnerships with all stakeholders, compromise, and a willingness to be “reasonable”. By staking out a principled position and sticking to it, the NYC Department of Health achieved its goals, educated the public and set an example for other local health departments across the country.

Forceful advocacy sets the stage for subsequent victories.

While the New York City Department of Health took the lead on this issue, its campaign to phase out artificial trans fat stood on the shoulders of previous advocacy. In 1994, the Center for Science in the Public Interest began a 12 year effort to win the FDA requirement for trans fat labeling on store-bought foods. In 2003, Denmark passed a law that made it illegal for any food to contain more than 2% transfat. A May 2003 lawsuit by Ban Trans Fat against multinational food company Kraft led to a settlement in which Kraft agreed to produce trans fat free Oreo cookies for school markets. Ban Trans Fat also sued McDonalds for false advertising regarding its use of reduced trans fat cooking oil. In 2005, McDonalds settled the case by agreeing to act to limit trans fat and to pay the American Heart Association to sponsor public education on trans fats. In 2006, the American Heart Association became the first major medical organization to urge a specific limit on trans fat in the diet. In 2006, the New England Journal of Medicine published a study that concluded that daily consumption of 5 grams or more of trans fats raised the risk of heart attacks by 25% and that many of the “large” size fast food meals served by McDonalds and KFC exceeded this 5 gram limit. (The study also found that a New York City McDonalds meal had the highest trans fat content of any site in the 20 countries tested around the world.)3

These various efforts helped to educate the public about trans fats, to convince policy makers that it was an issue that deserved attention and set the stage for more assertive actions such as the New York City ban.

Interview with Reverend Jessie Brown

Reverend Jessie Brown is minister of two congregations in Philadelphia and a community leader who successfully fought the introduction of Uptown cigarettes in Philadelphia in 1991. Working with National Association of African Americans for Positive Imagery (NAAPI), of which Reverend Brown is the founder and executive director, he and other community leaders charged R.J. Reynolds with creating and marketing a new tobacco product specifically to African Americans. Because of their campaign, R.J. Reynolds pulled Uptown Cigarettes from the market. Today Reverend Brown continues to work nationally in tobacco control. He was the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit brought by NAAPI against the tobacco industries for marketing menthol cigarettes to African Americans. His work has been featured on many major news outlets and broadcasted throughout the world. Reverend Brown is also the chair of the US World No Tobacco Day Committee.

CHW: How did you start working in tobacco control?

JBROWN: In 1989, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company announced that they were coming to Philadelphia to create a new cigarette that was going to be specifically targeted to African Americans. And Philadelphia was going to be the test market site for that cigarette. We formed a community opposition group that thwarted their efforts to promote this. In fact, they withdrew the cigarette totally. It never reached the market.

CHW:: This was the “Uptown Cigarette,” correct?

JBROWN: Right, that was Uptown. R.J. Reynolds proudly announced that they were going to create a cigarette that was going to be specifically for African Americans and they thought they were being sensitive by telling everybody that they are now paying attention to the African American community. Of course, what they’re failing to do — which a cigarette company always fails to do — is to articulate the deadly nature of its product. So they treated it as if they were selling graham crackers rather than selling something that was highly addictive and highly dangerous to the African American community. So yes, they announced it in the Wall Street Journal in December 1989. By January 19, 1990, R.J. Reynolds formerly announced that it was going to withdraw that cigarette.

CHW: So, no packs of Uptown cigarettes were ever sold. Is that right?

JBROWN: None were ever sold. That’s correct.

CHW: Did you ever actually see the cigarettes?

JBROWN: Yes, I have a pack.

CHW: How was Uptown specifically targeted toward the African American community?

JBROWN: The color [used in the packaging] is red, black, and green — African Liberation colors — with the predominant color being black; and, of course, the green and red stripes. Secondly, we believe (this is our interpretation) that the majority of people who probably would be using it were laborers and did not like to get their hands on the filters to make them dirty. They packed them upside down so that you didn’t have to flip them over, just knock them out, and you pick it up from the end that you generally light, and stick it in your mouth.

CHW: What strategies do you think contributed to the success of the campaign?

JBROWN: One, we moved very quickly to consolidate the medical interests, community interests, as well as the church interests in our opposing what R.J. Reynolds was doing. And in doing so, we beat them to the punch, garnering most of the support in Philadelphia to oppose them on the product, including getting Ebony Magazine who also put out a statement that they were not going to market the product. This kind of stuff had never happened before, period. No one in the tobacco control movement had ever stopped the industry from marketing a cigarette. We were the first.

CHW: Did you do most of your community organizing through the churches?

JBROWN: Well, a combination. We already had identified from previous campaigns, churches who were sympathetic to the mission of health promotion. And some of the city council members became involved, the local agencies — heart, lung, and cancer locally — took a high backup role and put their resources, time, money, and energy and staff into making certain that this campaign came off well.

CHW: What kinds of successful tactics did you use in the Uptown Campaign?

JBROWN: We took black paint and painted over cigarette billboards in neighborhoods and communities. And, of course, that was to get a message out that we did not want that kind of advertising in our neighborhoods. And billboards are the kind of thing you can’t turn off. They’re always on. And the only way we were going to get the upper hand on this was that those things be taken out of our community. We also had T-shirts and cap exchange programs. That was where we would take T-shirts and caps that had an alcohol or tobacco logo, or other kinds of paraphernalia and exchange it for a T-shirt or a cap that had a positive message. We did that in a number of places, and particularly around me going to court since I was the only one arrested for the “black washing” [billboard alteration]. That gave us an activity, and a way to attract people to come down to the courthouse.

CHW: You got arrested for altering the billboards? And you got people to come down to the courtroom?

JBROWN: Yes. We filled up the courtroom. And the outdoor advertising industry or the tobacco industry was not interested in really prosecuting, so all the charges were eventually dropped. But while they were shaking their sabers, we decided to use it for an opportunity for education — community education. And it was extremely successful. And a number of other groups around the country also picked up on the idea, and did it themselves as well.

CHW: I’ve spoken with someone who does research in Harlem about billboard ads and point of sale marketing, and she says that a lot of folks just sort of casually do this now, and if they see an alcohol ad, they’ll just tear it down off the phone booth, or paint over it, or put a sticker over it. Do you see a relationship between that and the activities you guys did?

JBROWN: Sure. We’ve given people permission to take charge of their environment and their community. You know, not everybody is willing to take charge of that. And in some places, it could literally be deemed vandalism or there could be of legal consequences to that, but at some level, communities should be in charge of the images that come into their community — not corporate America. And when corporations don’t do what they need to do in the best interest of the community, particularly tobacco and alcohol, then the community needs to take control of that process for themselves.

CHW: So it seems that public opinion of the tobacco industry has worsened.

JBROWN: But, it won’t stay there.

CHW: You don’t think so?

JBROWN: No. We have to make sure it stays there. Corporations, like everything else, have the ability to advertise their way out of this. We don’t have the advertising dollars that they do. They spend billions. We spend a few — you know — for every billion dollars they spend, we may spend a thousand dollars on advertising. So we’re talking about equal partners in this process. And over time, if we are not vigilant, they’ll be able to raise their image, cause nobody stays down on any organization forever. And we also have this mixed message thing going sometimes that somehow they’re doing the right thing. And some people buy into that.

CHW: You mean in terms of the so-called “tobacco education” that they do?

JBROWN: Yeah, but we know — for those of us who are directly involved with them, we see their advertising campaigns, and we know that they are still going after young people. And we know that it’s in their best interest to do so because they would have no customers in fairly short order if they didn’t replace the ones that they lose.

CHW: So, what do you think the impact the “Uptown” campaign was on folks in Philadelphia?

JBROWN: Oh, I think it was more than just in Philadelphia. It was across the country. I think it did send a message to young people that the industry is out to get them. They were upset that the industry would come in and appropriate their culture, their language, and stuff like the Uptown Theater — one reason why they chose Philadelphia was because the Uptown Theater was a way to talk about fun. It has a historical context and perspective here. And a lot of young people were not too happy with that.

CHW: So the Uptown Campaign had a pretty significant effect…

JBROWN: Uptown, for a little bit, turned into a cottage industry to talk about the old community organizing, what we did, how it carried off, what the communities did. It is now part of some textbooks, as I understand it. They now teach about the fiasco of R.J. Reynolds in trying to market the Uptown Cigarette. And it’s used as a lesson learned in some schools, marketing schools. So it had a huge impact in a number of areas in addition to an impact on educating the community.

CHW: What kind of press did you get?

JBROWN: We had literally hundreds and hundreds of interviews done by our Media team; and what we did was identify six spokespersons who had it. You know, for instance, Dr. Bob Robertson was our statistics person. He knew the statistics. We all knew them, of course, but someone called and said they wanted to talk about statistical information, we’d put him up. I was kind of the community person, and I would talk about the community organizing part of it. We had a medical doctor talk about the medical issues around it. We had a politician talk about the political fallout that ensues from such promotion activities. So we chose our spokespeople well to meet various general media needs, but we did it based on what kind of message we wanted to get out, not necessarily what the media wanted to say.

CHW: And so how long did it take before R.J. Reynolds made the announcement that they were removing the cigarette?

JBROWN: In reality, thirteen days. That’s what we officially say. It was actually nine from the time that we formally organized to the time that R.J. Reynolds withdrew.

CHW: Tell me a little more about NAAAPI’s focus.

JBROWN: NAAAPI’s original notion was that we would deal with advertising images that were negative to the community which included tobacco, alcohol, and the media. As tobacco control money became available, and a lot of NAAAPI’s work then went into tobacco control.

CHW: So it has evolved into more of an organization that does campaigns directed towards the tobacco industry?

JBROWN: Correct. I would say tobacco and alcohol because we did a number of alcohol initiatives as well, and they’re on the website, too.

CHW: What do you think the similarities between the alcohol industry and the tobacco industries are in terms of targeting specific communities?

JBROWN: They’re working from the same playbook essentially. Their marketing techniques [of] wrapping themselves around community and social concerns and needs in order to sell their product is exactly the same between the two. Both of their products take a heavy toll on the community.

CHW: In terms of health?

JBROWN: In terms of health and life and quality of life. Because we know that, particularly with alcohol, and even with tobacco, the stresses that are placed on families create issues of domestic violence and neglect so even the quality of life is diminished by the product. You’ve got children who may be exposed, and the stress it puts on the family with kids who are sick, constantly sick; not to mention the prenatal issues that mothers have around giving birth and low birth weight babies.

CHW: I read a recent Washington Post article about new marketing used by the tobacco industry that involves naming cigarettes — alcohol flavored cigarettes — using gambling lingo. “Screwdriver Slots,” “Blackjack Gin.” Have you heard of this?

JBROWN: Yes. It’s par for the course. Again, all of those industries. The alcohol industry, itself, is trying to do that by taking some of its brand nicknames and making wine coolers using similar names, so that they would then break down the sensitivity, particularly of young people, to the aversion of alcohol, and get them involved. Again, they got to replace the customer base that’s dying off. Again, they’re working from the same playbook. And if they can crosspollinate each other, and sell cigarettes and alcohol and gambling, then that’s what they’ll do.

CHW: So, do you think there’s any conscious collaboration between the alcohol and the tobacco industry?

JBROWN: Well, it’s conscious in the advertising companies that they use, yeah. If you’ll look behind the scenes, you’ll find that a number of the advertising companies that advertise alcohol also advertise tobacco. They’re collaborating in that sense. They may not be holding meetings together, and I’m not so sure that they won’t, or are not; but I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if they did.

CHW: Is there any documentation of the alcohol industry’s marketing techniques?

JBROWN: Oh, absolutely. Go on the website. You’ll see Power Master Malt Liquor – targeted to young black men. We stopped them from advertising their product and that product [was] withdrawn from the market. That was a high alcoholic content beverage. Yes, alcohol does the exact same thing. They still do it. They just get away with it more often right now.

CHW: Do you see any similarities between the role of tobacco and alcohol corporations and food corporations in the black community?

JBROWN: The answer is “Yes, in one sense of the word.” And this is one of those things where I think the greater weight lies with personal responsibility as opposed to corporate responsibility. A soda, if taken in moderation, will not kill you. Unlike a cigarette, don’t matter how you take it, it could catch up with you somewhere down the line. I mean, you know, it’s that kind of thing. But I think we can win the battle. I would tone down the industry’s promotion of their product, and force them to better tell the truth in their marketing promotion. I also think we need a public promotion campaign that really promotes healthy lifestyles, health living, and its benefits. If we get just as good at talking about the benefits and promoting a healthy lifestyle as the industry does at promoting fast foods, or promoting alcohol, or promoting tobacco, then I think we can easily win the battle. It’s like, one of the things we were promoting, way back when, was if the tobacco industry was going to continue to advertise, they had to turn over a quarter to one third of all billboard advertising to public health messages about tobacco, which we would design and put up there. They didn’t want to do that. And the reason is simple. Our one good message would outdo three of theirs any day.

CHW: They’d rather have nothing up there.

JBROWN: They would rather have nothing up there. Correct. Because they can then go to putting it in magazines, and continue to give away T-Shirts and caps. They’re getting a lot of what we call “unpaid walking billboards.” You know, those whole campaigns.

CHW: Apparently, a lot of young people wear these items.

JBROWN: Yes. That’s why we had the T-Shirt/Cap exchange.

CHW: It was mostly young people that you did this with?

JBROWN: Oh, no. We actually got them from everybody. We did this in front of the police department. You know, the police department came out there and were bringing alcohol advertising off the walls of the police department to exchange. It was wonderful. And you actually get more adults who readily take this up than you do young people. Young people always take free stuff, but here we’ll get adults exchanging stuff with us, more than we did the kids. But the point was, we’re taking advertising off the street.

CHW: The tobacco industry has a history of financial involvement in the African American community, as well. Is that correct?

JBROWN: That’s correct.

CHW: So, in your own experience in Philadelphia, have campaigns and awareness and public education had an affect on how community groups and businesses deal financially with the tobacco industry?

JBROWN: Yes. For a number of those groups it has been “Hush money.” And some of the civic and social organizations that have traditionally led battles to stop the exploitation of African Americans were silent or in some cases even promoted the interests of the tobacco industry or the alcohol industry. Even Ebony magazine has not done due diligence in providing ongoing information about the effects of tobacco, even with the huge effect tobacco has on the black community. And, of course, they didn’t do it because they were receiving ad revenues from the tobacco companies. In the millions and millions of dollars.

CHW: Does your organization accept funding from tobacco corporations?

JBROWN: Absolutely not. Matter of fact, if a group receives tobacco money in any way, shape, or form — or alcohol money, we will not directly work with that organization.

CHW: What do you think the role of the tobacco industry and their policies and practices in exacerbating health disparities?

JBROWN: A high percentage of African Americans smoke mentholated cigarettes. And until we made a big noise in the last few years, no one had even tested the notion of whether or not menthol contributed to a higher disease rate which would impact African Americans more highly than others. We believe it does because all of the studies, even the industry studies, show that menthol in a burned form is, in itself, a carcinogen. So African Americans may have been deliberately targeted by the industry with a more addictive and more deadly product.

CHW: In closing, I’d like to ask, what are your thoughts on the potential of the tobacco industry to be held accountable for its impact on the health of the Africa American community, or the public health in general?

JBROWN: Well, there are two things that I think that can make that happen. One is that people really get upset over it. And two, we put a Congress in there who actually do their jobs to protect the public interest around these issues. And we haven’t had a Congress that has been out there to protect the public’s interest around this. And you know, they get a lot of money from the industry, as well. So they formulate their opinions based on how much money they get. And regardless of what they say, we know that the vast majority of legislators that are receiving $50,000 — even $5,000. It doesn’t take much, apparently, to buy off a legislator. They have been extremely solid. They have not protected America’s interests.

Resources Update: Windfall Medicare Profits for Drug Companies

In January 2006, when the new Medicare Part D drug program went into effect, pharmaceutical companies’ profits were estimated to exceed $2 billion or more annually. The transfer into Medicare of millions of low-income people previously covered under Medicaid provided pharmaceuticals companies with a new source of profit. The Part D proviso that prohibited the federal government from negotiating directly for the lowest available prices further raised profits. In contrast, states have been able to negotiate and receive the lowest available prices for drugs for their Medicaid recipients. However, with the recent elections that gave Democrats control of the Congress, pharmaceutical companies are poised to do battle, as Democrats gear up to eliminate the restriction against the federal government’s ability to negotiate for lowest prices on behalf of Medicare recipients.

Leading Big Pharma’s defense is former Representative Billy Tauzin, who left the House in 2003 after helping to pass the new Medicare Bill to accept an annual salary of more than $2 million as President of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. Another heavyweight drug lobbyist is Thomas Scully, who served as the Bush Administration’s Medicare expert and helped steer the drug subsidy bill to passage before accepting his lobbyist position in 2003.

GAO Calls for Improvements in FDA Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising

Tauzin also made the news recently in urging voluntary guidelines for direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising by the pharmaceutical industry. In a speech to venture capitalists last spring, he observed that, “It would be naive to not acknowledge the fact that D.T.C. advertising is also a lightening-rod in the health care debate in this country.”

Between 1997 and 2005, consumer drug advertising jumped from $1.1 billion a year to $4.2 billion. A recent report to Congress by the Government Accountability Office on FDA oversight of DTC advertising recommended improvements. Congress recently held hearings on the issue. In rejecting Tauzin’s call for voluntary guidelines, Senator Edward Kennedy noted that, “Patients deserve the best and most accurate information about the medicines they take. An essential part of any drug safety proposal must be to give the F.D.A. the authority and resources it needs to oversee direct-to-consumer advertising, and to allow the FDA to impose conditions or limits on that advertising, where needed to protect the public health.”

GAO: Number of New Drugs is Declining

While profits and advertising are up, the number of new drugs is declining, according to another recent report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The GAO found that while annual spending for research and development increased by 147 percent, the number of new drug applications grew only by 38 percent. Furthermore, the new applications were for drugs that represented modifications to existing medicines, not new medicines. Such a disparity raises doubts about the pharmaceutical industry claim that rising drug prices are a reflection of new drug development.

Jumpstart Ford

As part of its mission, Jumpstart Ford works to move the company from its current “worst polluter status” toward acting as a role model in a movement that partners corporations with campaigns and advocacy organizations to achieve a cleaner future for America’s auto manufacturers and consumers.

The campaign’s decision to focus directly on the Ford Corporation rather than on regulatory change follows a trend among environmental and public health advocates, but the campaign is by no means soft in its demands, which include pressuring Ford to produce a fleet of cars and SUVs that average 50 mpg by 2010 and zero emissions by 2020.  In the summer of 2006, the campaign’s website reported new blockades at Ford mega dealerships in Ft. Lauderdale and Los Angeles, as well as the founding of a summer “Freedom from Oil Action camp” which taught new activists the ins and outs of targeting the automobile industry for change in the interest of public and environmental health and safety.  Jumpstart Ford sees America’s oil dependence not only as a threat to human and environmental health, but also as a threat to national security.
During the November 2006 midterm elections, many candidates ran on a platform of lowering America’s dependence on foreign oil, thereby strengthening domestic security.  Given the frequency with which this platform was presented, Jumpstart Ford’s strategy of focusing on public and environmental health, safety and national security, is poised to have more impact on Ford Motor Company’s practices in the near future.

Auto Asthma Index

A tool launched by The Environmental Working Group’s [EWG] that allows consumers and public health advocates to compare the asthma-causing emissionsof automobiles by manufacturer, make, year and model.

Public Health Advocacy to Change Corporate Practices: Implications for Health Education Practice and Research

Corporate practices, such as advertising, public relations, lobbying, litigation, and sponsoring scientific research, have a significant impact on the health of the people in the United States. Recently, health professionals and advocates have created a newscope of practice that aims to modify corporate practices that harm health. This article describes how corporate policies influence health and reviews recent health campaigns aimed at changing corporate behavior in six industries selected for their central role in the U.S. economy and their influence on major causes of mortality and morbidity. These are the alcohol, automobile, food, gun, pharmaceutical, and tobacco industries. The article defines corporate disease promotion and illustrates the range of public health activities that have emerged to counter such corporate behaviors. It analyzes the role of health professionals, government, and advocacy groups in these campaigns and assesses the implications of this domain for health education practice and research.

Public Health Advocacy to Change Corporate Practices: Implications for Health Education Practice and Research [pdf] 

In recent years, citizens, consumer and health activists, state and local government officials, and health professionals have created a new arena of public health advocacy designed to change corporate policies that damage health. Tobacco control activists have been at the forefront, winning new legislation to restrict advertising, limit public smoking, and raise excise taxes and forcing the tobacco industry to contribute billions of dollars to pay for tobacco-related illnesses and support efforts to reduce smoking (Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Kluger, 1997; Schroeder, 2004). More recently, however, consumer and environmental activists have also targeted the automobile industry for its production and advertising of unsafe and polluting sports utility vehicles (SUVs; Bradsher, 2002; Gladwell, 2004). Health, food, and nutrition groups have challenged the food industry for its contributions to obesity and diabetes (Nestle, 2002, 2003), and antiviolence, public safety, and health organizations have opposed the marketing and production practices of the gun industry (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003; Diaz, 1999). Mothers Against Drunk Driving and its allies have criticized the alcohol industry for its youth-oriented advertising (Hamilton, 2000); health professionals, senior citizens, and health care reformers have taken on the pharmaceutical industry for making windfall profits based on publicly funded research, covering up harmful side effects of their products, and disease mongering, creating, or exaggerating new diagnoses to promote sales of their products (Angell, 2004; Moyniham, Heath, & Henry, 2002; Topol, 2004).

This special section of Health Education & Behavior examines this new public health advocacy to change health-damaging corporate behavior and analyzes its implication for health education practice and research. In this article, I define the concept of disease promotion, review the scientific and political rationale for efforts to change corporate behavior, and provide an overviewof the scope of this emerging arena of health advocacy. I also explore its implications for health education practice and research.

In the next article, Dorfman,Wallack, andWoodruff (2005) use the concept of framing to assess commonalities among recent public health campaigns to control, for example, the tobacco, food, and gun industries, and to analyze the underlying philosophical and moral frameworks for these debates. They suggest that health educators can use new insights on framing from research in communications, political science, sociology, and media studies to win broader public support for health objectives. In the third article, Nathanson (2005) compares the achievements of tobacco control movements in the United States, Canada, France, and Great Britain. She argues that political systems, historical traditions, and government structures in each nation create unique opportunities
and constraints for tobacco control and suggests that this cross-national perspective can help health educators and other health professionals plan more effective strategies. Finally, Kreuter (2005) examines the relevance of this new public health practice and locates it within the context of health promotion both in the United States and around the world.


Disease promotion describes organizational practices or policies that encourage unhealthy behaviors, lifestyles, or environments. The concept is based on the social determinants of health literature, which identifies social, political, and structural factors and processes that contribute to patterns of health and disease. Recently, researchers have called for greater attention to these determinants and have advocated increased scientific and professional efforts to develop interventions that address this level of causation (Marmot, 2002; Tarlov & St. Peter, 2000; Wilkinson, 1996). In addition, disease promotion borrows from the concept of health promotion and its emphasis on agency—the ability to act to improve health—but reverses the focus to spotlight actors and actions that harm health.

No level of social organization has a monopoly on disease promotion: cells, organs, individuals, groups, organizations, government, and ecosystems can each act to advance disease. Our focus here, however, is on population health and therefore on organizational agents of disease promotion. The goal of studying the process of disease promotion is to identify opportunities for prevention.

Corporations have long been an essential component of American society. In the late 19th century, they emerged as central agents of the American economy, and today, most observers agree that they dominate the global economy (Bakan, 2004; Berle & Means, 1968; Friedman, 1982; Galbraith, 1952). Their actions shape every aspect of our health and lives, from the food we eat and the air we breathe to our concepts of democracy, sexuality, intimacy, and self-worth. Obviously, corporations play a vital role in our economy: They provide millions of jobs, produce many of the goods and services that distinguish the American lifestyle, pay taxes, and contribute to charity.

But it is equally evident that corporate practices play a central role inAmerica’s health problems. According to a recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report (Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, & Gerberding, 2004, 2005), in 2000, products of the tobacco industry were estimated to kill 435,000 Americans a year; diet and physical inactivity, in part because of food industry advertising and the easy availability of high-fat, high-calorie foods, were implicated in at least 365,000 deaths; alcohol was associated with 85,000 deaths, including homicides, automobile accidents, and alcohol-related diseases, such as cirrhosis and liver cancer; 43,000 Americans died in automobile accidents, and several thousand additional deaths were associated with automobile pollution; and 29,000 Americans died in gun-related homicides, suicides, or accidents, and many more were injured. Finally, by pricing its drugs out of reach of people who need them, opposing policies that would lower prices, covering up life-threatening side effects, and focusing on the most profitable drugs rather than those that best protect public health, the drug industry contributes to many excess deaths (Angell, 2004; Topol, 2004). In addition to the lost lives, the products of these industries cost consumers, taxpayers, and the larger society billions of dollars of costs in health care and lost productivity (CDC, 2002; Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, & Wang, 2003). Sturm (2002) has estimated that the annual U.S.
health care costs associated with obesity are $395 per person, with current or former tobacco use $230 per year and with problem drinking $150 per year, costs that can be seen in part as industry taxes on society and individuals.

Obviously, not every death or illness related to a particular product can be blamed on corporate practices. No complex health problem has a single cause, and undoubtedly, biological, behavioral, cultural, and environmental factors contribute to morbidity and mortality from tobacco, food, automobile, guns, alcohol, and pharmaceuticals. Here, the epidemiological concept of attributable risk is helpful. Attributable risk indicates the absolute incidence of a condition that can be attributed to a causal factor; it is a function of both relative risk (the ratio of incidence in those exposed versus those not exposed) and the prevalence of the causal factor (Susser, 1973). Precisely because corporate practices, such as advertising and political interference with regulation, are so ubiquitous, their influence is significant. To give a hypothetical example, even if exposure to fast food advertising contributed much less to obesity than an obesity gene at the individual level, the fact that so many more people are exposed to advertising than carry the obesity gene would mean that advertising caused more cases of obesity than genetic factors.

Clearly, the number of tobacco and gun deaths would decline precipitously if these industries did not produce, promote, and distribute their products; their efforts to resist public control have contributed substantially to mortality. On the other hand, the food, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries produce goods that can both enhance and damage health. However, the fact that an industry may contribute to health problems should not discourage investigation of policies aimed at limiting its harmful consequences.

Future research is needed to quantify the attributable risk related to specific industry practices. But the pervasive exposure to disease-promoting practices and the very substantial health burden the products of these industries impose require public health professionals to examine whether changing the behavior of corporations is a promising strategy for improving public health and achieving national health goals, such as those articulated in Healthy People 2010 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999).

Some evidence supports the value of policy change to modify corporate behavior. In 1998, the Congressional Prevention Coalition, a bipartisan group of more than 60 lawmakers dedicated to prevention, asked the Partnership for Prevention (2000), a nonprofit nonpartisan group, to assess opportunities for prevention. Based on interviews with more than 80 public health researchers, the group identified several policies with the greatest potential for reducing mortality and morbidity. Six strategies with potential for saving almost 250,000 lives a year require changing corporate practices or overcoming corporate opposition. Table 1 shows these six policies and the expert panel’s estimate of the number of lives each change would save annually.

[Table 1: Priorities for Policy Change – see PDF]

In this article, I have chosen to focus on six industries (tobacco, food, automobile, gun, alcohol, and pharmaceutical) because of their central role in health and disease, their importance to the U.S. and global economies, and their economic and political influence and because public health advocates have already acted to modify their practices (Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 2001; Angell, 2004; Center on Alcohol Marketing and Youth, 2002; Diaz, 1999; Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Nestle, 2002).


A systematic study of health advocacy to change corporate practices would benefit from a framework that focuses on variables of interest and allows comparisons across industries, cases, and levels of social organization (e.g., local, state, or national). Figure 1 shows such a conceptual model for the study of campaigns to change corporate behaviors that harm health. I propose it as a heuristic to guide future research, subject to modification based on empirical findings. These campaigns are shaped by the broader social and political context (Box 1 in Figure 1), which includes political structures (Nathanson, 2005), economic conditions, cultural beliefs, and historical influences
(Cohen, 2003; Hertz, 2001). The second row shows each of the three principal actors: corporations and their allies (Box 2); the government, including the federal, state, and local levels and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Box 3); and public health and advocacy organizations (Box 4), which includes health departments (which thus may appear in both Boxes 3 and 4; see Wolfson, 2001, for a discussion), health care providers, professional organizations, advocacy groups, and others. Each of these actors has organizational structures, histories, cultures, and connections with various networks and faces external pressures that influence their behaviors. In the third row, the focus is on this behavior itself, the actions that corporations (Box 5) and health professionals and
advocates (Box 6) take in their efforts to change or defend corporate practices and policies
deemed to harm health. As shown in the fourth row, these interactions shape health outcomes (Box 7), which are also influenced by other biological, environmental, behavioral, social, and political factors. The vertical and horizontal arrows in Figure 1 show the dynamic character of these public health campaigns and also the multiple opportunities for intervention.

[Figure 1 – Conceptual model for the study of campaigns to change corporate practices that harm
health – see PDF]

For public health advocates, the central question is the following: What actions can best ensure that their activities lead to improved health outcomes? For health researchers, the key questions are the following: What is the relative efficacy of these interventions compared to others, what factors influence the process and outcome of these interactions, and to what extent can findings derived from one campaign or one industry be generalized to another? In the next section, I examine some of the actors and actions engaged in campaigns to change corporate practices.


Corporate practices and policies that damage health are carried out by a variety of actors. Although corporations, such as Philip Morris (Kessler, 2001), Colt Industries (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003), and Merck (Hawthorne, 2003), have played central roles in defending their own practices against public health critics, other players are also important. Advertisers, for example, design and carry out campaigns to increase sales of harmful products. Trade associations, such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (Angell, 2004) and the National Shooting Sports Foundation (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003), often serve as the public voice of industries. Lobbying and lawfirms, such as Hill and Knowlton (Kluger, 1997) and Verner, Liipfert, Bernard, McPherson, and Hand (Pertschuk, 2001), often act to advance the legislative and legal agendas of several of the industries reviewed here. Retail associations also contribute to lobbying and legislation at the state and local levels. Citizen organizations also act to defend corporations. The National Rifle Association (NRA), for example, is one of the most influential organizations inWashington, D.C., and often acts to defend the gun industry (P.H. Brown & Abel, 2003).

A few analysts have assessed the respective roles of these actors in specific circumstances (Bradsher, 2002; P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003; Nestle, 2002; Pertschuk, 2001), but more research is needed to identify the particular and generalizable contributions of each and the implications for advocacy campaigns.

Corporate Behaviors That Promote Diseases

Corporations and their allies engage in a variety of actions to advance their agendas.

Advertising. Advertising seeks to create new customers and encourage existing ones to purchase more. When the product being advertised is lethal (as in the case of tobacco or guns) or can easily be used in ways that harm health (e.g., alcohol, SUVs, and some pharmaceuticals), advertising falls squarely within the rubric of disease promotion. The six target industries spend vast amounts on advertising, as shown in Table 2. In 2003, the domestic advertising spending for these six industries alone ($38.7 billion) was 7 times greater than the combined total budgets of the U.S. CDC and Prevention ($3.84 billion), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA; $1.45 billion), the Federal Trade Commission ($176.5 million), and the Consumer Safety Product Commission ($57 million; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2003).

As manufacturers saturate their potential customers in one population, advertising seeks new markets, thus creating the potential to spread risks to health. For example, the tobacco industry targets African Americans and smokers in the developing world (Balbach, Gasior, & Barbeau, 2003), the gun industry persuadeswomen to buy handguns to feel safer (Brady, n.d.), and the alcohol industry markets sweet wine coolers to young drinkers (Garfield, Chung, & Rathouz, 2003). In recent years, drug companies have advertised prescription drugs directly to consumers. “Feeling sad? Anxious? Tired?” asks a Pfizer ad for the antidepressant drug Zoloft (Ives, 2003). Although drug and media companies claim that these ads empower consumers to make informed choices and communicate better with their doctors, consumer advocates claim they downplay side effects
or adverse reactions and may lead some patients to pressure doctors to prescribe medicines they do not need (Ives, 2003).

[Table 2 – Annual Spending on Advertising, Political Contributions, and Number of Lobbyists by
Industry – see PDF]

Public Relations. Public relations fosters a positive public image for corporate America and blocks proposals that harm its perceived interests (Marchand, 1998). When critics challenge the safety of a product, corporations and their trade associations often respond forcefully, seeking to influence the debate in such a way as to preclude action to limit profits, restrict advertising, or regulate manufacturing or distribution. For example, when the FDA proposed new regulations for vitamins, industry groups sponsored television ads showing soldiers storming suburban homes to seize vitamin C bottles (Kessler, 2001, p. 335).

To make their public messages more credible, industries may create front groups to act as their public voice. Philip Morris formed the National Smokers Alliance to contest tobacco regulation (Kessler, 2001, p. 170); the tobacco, food, and restaurant industries funded the Center for Consumer Freedom to oppose smoking bans in public places and lower legal limits on blood alcohol levels (Brownell, 2003, p. 269); and the auto industry hired aWashington lobbying firm to create Nevadans for Fair Fuel Economy Standards, a paper organization that opposed higher mileage standards that would reduce pollution (Bradsher, 2002, p. 64). To improve its public image, the food industry has supported the American Dietetic Association (Nestle, 2002), and the tobacco industry has contributed to arts, sports, and African American groups (Kluger, 1997).

As Dorfman et al. (2005) explain, public relations seeks to frame the public dialogue on issues relevant to the industry. Across the six industries reviewed here, corporations articulate strikingly similar messages: Market mechanisms provide the best remedies for dangers to consumers, it is wrong to restrict advertising of legal products, individuals are responsible for their own behavior, and having choices is the American way (Brownell, 2003 pp. 258-268; Diaz, 1999; Menashe & Siegel, 1998). In many cases, corporate publicrelations expenses are tax deductible, creating a public subsidy for messages intended to thwart policy changes to protect health.

Industries also use more subtle forms of public relations to quell unfavorable portrayals. In a stark display of the power of the tobacco industry, in the 1980s, nowomen’s magazine that accepted tobacco advertising published a single article, editorial, or column on the harmful effects of tobacco, despite the fact that it was then that lung cancer surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer deaths among women (Anderson, 1995; Hertz, 2001, p. 137). As U.S. and global media ownership becomes more concentrated among a handful of large multinational corporations (Bagdikian, 2004), often with links to the six industries described here, the willingness of major media outlets to investigate corporate malfeasance or disease promotion may further diminish.

Lobbying and Other Legislative Activities. Lobbying and other legislative activities are a central tool for advancing corporate objectives. In 2000, the Center for Responsive Politics (n.d.) estimated that there were more than 20,000 registered lobbyists in Washington, D.C. About 1,000 lobbyists work in the nation’s capital for the food industry (Nestle, 2002, p. 99) and 675 for the pharmaceutical industry (S. Brown & Doyle, 2004; see Table 2). More lobbyists work in state capitals. In the mid-1990s, for example, the tobacco industry had 25 lobbyists in Minnesota alone (Wolfson, 2001, p. 153) working to defeat or water down that state’s tobacco regulations.

Lobbyists work both to pass legislation that benefits their employers and to defeat laws deemed to be harmful. In 2003, the pharmaceutical industry poured millions of dollars into a concerted, and successful, lobbying effort to convince Congress to pass legislation that would increase coverage of senior citizens for some prescription drugs and defeat provisions that would have allowed the federal government to negotiate lower prices on behalf of Medicare patients or import lower cost medicines from Europe or Canada. Analysts estimated the law would increase drug company profits by $13 billion a year. Pharmaceutical companies acted despite overwhelming public support for the restrictions they opposed and expert opinion that the measure would leave major gaps in coverage
and fail to contain costs (Connolly, 2003). In 1994, lobbyists for the dietary supplement industry succeeded in persuading Congress and the president to agree to label dietary supplements as foods rather than drugs, thus escaping FDA requirements for safety and effectiveness. A few years later, after aggressive advertising of the benefits of these products, deaths from supplements, such as ephedra, illustrated the public health costs of this deregulation and led to calls for renewed public oversight (Fontarosa, Drummond, & DeAngelis, 2003).

Corporate success at lobbying is increased by the revolving door between industry and the government. For example, presidential adviser Karl Rove had been chief political strategist for Philip Morris before working for Bush, and the president’s chief of staff, Andrew Card, had been General Motors’ top lobbyist in Washington, D.C. (Bradsher, 2002). Dan Glickman, secretary of agriculture in the Clinton administration, left office to join a law firm that lobbies for agriculture and food companies (Nestle, 2002, p. 100). In 1994, when Philip Morris needed someone to testify against FDA regulation of tobacco before Congress, it hired former FDA Commissioner Charles Edwards, paying him $120,000 for the consultancy (Kessler, 2001, p. 315). In 1998, 128 former members of Congress were listed as lobbyists, 12% of all senators and representatives who had left office since 1970 (Abramson, 1998; Nestle, 2002, p. 100). Compared to the handful of lobbyists who advocate for public health, these personal and professional associations between elected and appointed officials and corporate lobbyists provide industry with a competitive advantage in influencing legislation and regulation.

Campaign Contributions and Electoral Activities. Campaign contributions and electoral activities help cement this advantage by increasing the chances that the legislators or executive branch officials that lobbyists meet will be grateful or indebted to them. The six industries reviewed here each make substantial campaign contributions, as shown in Table 2. Many industry political action committees contribute to both parties, ensuring influence no matter what the outcome of an election. In 2002, for example, the drug industry contributed about $22 million to the Republicans and almost $8 million to Democrats (S. Brown & Doyle, 2004). The NRA and its gun industry allies offer not only financial support to sympathetic candidates but also assistance in voter mobilization and campaigning (Diaz, 1999), helping to explain why the gun industry and the NRA consistently win legislative victories even though public opinion polls show high levels of public support for restrictions on assault rifles and opposition to exempting gun manufacturers from liability suits.

Litigation. Litigation allows industry to delay, weaken, or overturn laws and regulations they dislike. The six industries have gone to court to seek action against individuals, organizations, and government agencies that they perceived as threats to their business goals. For example, in 1996, the Texas Cattle Ranchers Association filed a $10 million suit against OprahWinfrey for violating that state’s food disparagement lawby saying the threat of mad cow disease made her stop eating hamburgers. Although Winfrey ultimately won, she spent more than $1 million defending herself, a cost that might deter less wealthy critics (Nestle, 2002, pp. 162-165). In 1994, Philip Morris filed a $10 billion libel lawsuit against ABC television for reporting that cigarettes were “artificially spiked”
with nicotine (Kessler, 2001, p. 156). A tobacco industry executive later commented that “with one legal action—the filing of the ABC suit—the word ‘spiking’ has been dropped from the lexicon of the anti-tobacco crowd. Frankly, if that is all the suit ever does, it will have beenworth it” (Kessler, 2001, p. 169). In 2000, seven gun makers filed a suit against Housing and Urban Development Secretary Andrew Cuomo, New York State Attorney General (AG) Elliott Spitzer, and other state and local officials, claiming they were violating the gun makers’right to sell legal firearms by seeking to force them to accept a code of conduct on the sale and design of handguns. The manufacturers did not seek monetary damages but instead asked the court to bar the officials from seeking to convince local
police departments to buy weapons only from companies that had signed the agreement (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003).

Scientific Research. Scientific research often influences the public debates about whether specific products harm health. Many industries seek to influence this debate by funding scientific research that will support their case and by hiring scientists to contest damaging information. Until the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement eliminated it, the Tobacco Institute funded scientists to refute links between smoking and health and to bring this so-called evidence to the public. The food industry supports nutrition researchers who emphasize exercise rather than diet as the cause of obesity, and the New York State AG recently brought the drug maker GlaxoSmithKline to court for failing to publish or disclose studies that showed no benefit from its popular antidepressant Paxil (Harris,
2004). Krimsky (2003), who has studied corporate behavior related to scientific research, uses the term manufactured doubt to describe the practice of sowing confusion to avoid or delay regulatory action.

Illegal Activities. Illegal activities are another strategy some corporations have used to advance their objectives. In the early 1970s, Ford Motor Company fabricated auto safety test data, leading to a $7 million fine (Yates, 1983, p. 261). In 1994, tobacco industry executives lied under oath to Congress about their prior knowledge on nicotine’s addictiveness (Kessler, 2001), and in 1999, the U.S. Justice Department reached a $255 million settlement with the vitamin industry for price fixing, a practice that made its products more expensive for consumers (Nestle, 2002, p. 168). Given spotty enforcement of regulations on corporate behavior, data are not available to ascertain whether illegal activities constitute the renegade actions of a few bad apples or a common business practice.

In summary, a variety of corporate behaviors, including advertising, public relations, lobbying, litigation, campaign contributions, and sponsored research, advance industry objectives of increasing profits and defeating stricter regulations. Although in most cases their activities comply with current laws, these actions nevertheless contribute to preventable illnesses and deaths. In most cases, there is no evidence that corporate managers who engage in these behaviors intend to harm health; although, the evidence of the harmful impact is usually widely known. Many of these corporate behaviors also appear to contradict free-market principles. Free markets depend on equal access to information and on competition. When corporate interests suppress information, obfuscate public debate, or stifle competition, they interfere with the market forces that proponents of free markets cite as the best protection for consumers.

Has the adverse impact of corporate influence on health worsened in recent years? Although data are not available to answer this question definitively, several trends provide cause for concern. First, advertising has increased significantly in the past 2 decades, and corporate influence now penetrates every sphere of public and private life, from the classrooms and malls to movies and music (Cohen, 2003). Second, corporate involvement in political life has grown significantly, with increases in the number of lobbyists, the amount of campaign contributions, and the influence of big business interests in Washington, D.C., and state capitals (Drew, 2000). Third, since 1980, many U.S. industries have been deregulated or allowed to monitor themselves, and the remaining regulatory agencies are often underfunded, understaffed, and frequently criticized by corporate and political leaders, making them less able and willing to carry out their missions (Hilts, 2003; Kessler, 2001). Finally, for a variety of reasons, a number of potentially countervailing powers, such as an informed and mobilized electorate, active consumer and environmental movements, forceful local and state officials, and a crusading media, have declined, leaving fewer voices to challenge corporate influence (Bagdikian, 2004; Cohen, 2003; Patterson, 2003). Whether the new public health activism described here can become such a counterweight remains to be seen.


A variety of constituencies have mobilized to take action to protect public health against these corporate practices. A review of campaigns against the six target industries reveals common actors, strategies, and outcomes.

The Actors

Who are the individuals and organizations involved in advocating for changes in corporate
practices? Several key stakeholder groups have played roles in many campaigns to modify corporate practices.

National Organizations. National organizations serve as conveners, clearinghouses, catalysts, and advocates in government arenas. Larger organizations often have full-time staffs of scientists, lawyers, educators, lobbyists, and organizers. Examples of such groups include the Center for Science in the Public Interest, Union of Concerned Scientists, Public Citizen, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Sierra Club, American Legacy Foundation (which also funds advocacy groups), American Lung Association, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. These organizations often have a detailed understanding of the policy process and the resources to compete with industry groups in legislative
and legal bodies. In some cases, the national groups can provide grassroots groups with credibility and clout; although, they may also seek to compromise grassroots militancy to achieve political compromises (Wolfson, 2001).

Coalitions. Coalitions bring together like-minded organizations to amplify their political power, share resources, or coordinate strategies. Coalitions organize political strategies, mobilize their constituencies, and educate the public. Most coalitions confine their attention to a single industry (e.g., tobacco, guns, or food), but some work across local, state, and national levels. Examples include the Coalition for a Healthy California, which led the effort to support tobacco control propositions (Glantz & Balbach, 2002, p. 382); the Coalition on Smoking or Health, which included several large national voluntary health organizations (Wolfson, 2001, p. 84); the Louisiana Alliance to Prevent Underage Drinking; and The Infant Feeding Action Coalition, which coordinated the boycott of
Nestle (2002, p. 149). Although coalitions play integral roles in campaigns to modify corporate
behavior, maintaining the coalition and keeping it focused on external goals can often be demanding (Pertschuk, 2001; Wolfson, 2001).

Health Professionals and Researchers. Health professionals and researchers provide scientific and technical expertise to efforts to modify health-damaging policies. They conduct original research, summarize available evidence, testify at public hearings or in court cases, and educate advocates and organizers. Organizations, such as the Center on Alcohol Marketing and Youth at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and the Center for Gun Policy and Research at Johns Hopkins University, and individuals, such as Marion Nestle, a nutritionist at New York University; Stanton Glantz, a tobacco researcher at the University of California San Francisco; and GarenWintimute, director of the Violence Prevention Research Program at the University of California Davis, have
provided epidemiological and policy evidence that advocates have taken to the political arena. Some researchers are advocates themselves, whereas others prefer to let theirwork speak for itself. Of course, other scientists also work for the corporations that are the targets of advocacy campaigns; contesting industry-supported research is often a key task for the researchers allied with advocacy efforts.

Public Health Agencies. Public health agencies, such as local and state health departments, have often become key players in campaigns against tobacco, alcohol, guns, and other harmful products. Local health departments are often active members of tobacco control coalitions, often funding community organizations to carry out education and advocacy (Wolfson, 2001). In Marin County, California, the county Department of Health and Human Services joined a coalition that successfully supplanted Miller Brewing Company as a sponsor for the county fair, using its booth at the fair to educate about alcohol rather than give out beer (Marin Institute, 2004). Some local health departments have also supported efforts to end the sales of high sugar soda in schools (Fried & Nestle, 2002).At the federal level, a fewadministrators have taken stands against health-damaging industries. As head of the FDA, for example, Kessler (2001) led the fight against the tobacco industry, and Dr. Jeffrey Runge, of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, has been an outspoken critic of the automobile industry’s failure to make safer cars (Skrzycki, 2003).

Legal Groups. Legal groups are at the front line of the litigation against the tobacco, automobile, food, and gun industries. Using class action lawsuits, they have sought damages, injunctions, and changes in advertising or manufacturing. Players include lawyers at universities and nonprofit groups, such as John Banzaf at GeorgeWashington University, the Northeastern University School of Law’s Tobacco Products Liability Project, and the Legal Action Project of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, and at law firms, such the Castano Group in New Orleans, a network of lawyers active in tobacco and gun litigation (P. H. Brown & Abel, pp. 301-303).

In the public sector, state AGs have played increasingly prominent roles in using litigation to protect consumers against corporate excesses. The best known example is the Master Tobacco Settlement negotiated by state AGs to end some forms of advertising and to fund antitobacco activities (Schroeder, 2004). New York AG Elliot Spitzer has also challenged the drug company GlaxoSmithKline for its failure to disclose negative information about a popular antidepressant, Paxil (Harris, 2004).

Local Organizations. Local organizations bring debates about corporate practices directly to their communities and often provoke a dialogue that sparks media coverage, popular mobilization, and a response from the government or industry. In many communities, for example, anti-SUV activists ticketed SUVs, charging them with pollution and defective safety designs (Earth on Empty, n.d.). In Philadelphia, a coalition of church and community groups forced Philip Morris to abandon its plan to introduce a new cigarette, Uptown, targeted at urban African Americans (Sutton, 1993).

Other Participants. Other participants in campaigns to change corporate practices include reporters and other media representatives, elected officials, and other business groups; for example, the insurance industry has often joined advocacy efforts to improve car safety. Often, these parties have helped mobilize public opinion, represent a group’s interest in the political arena, or add political heft to a campaign.

The Actions

The actors involved in campaigns to change corporate practices have used a variety of strategies to realize their objectives. Creating a typology of actions can help provide a framework for comparative assessment of the process and outcome of these strategies.

Getting Information. Getting information is often the first step in acting to change health-damaging corporate behavior. Advocates for tobacco and gun control have used the discovery process in court cases to uncover damaging information and industry efforts to hide such data (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003; Kessler, 2001). National advocacy groups, such as Public Citizen and Center for Science in the Public Interest, have used the Freedom of Information Act to extract information about business activities from reluctant regulators (Hilts, 2003, p. 197). In some cases, industry insiders with troubled consciences have turned to the mass media to tell their stories, alleging, for example, that the tobacco industry covered up harmful data and that the gun industry knew its products were going to illegal dealers (Butterfield, 2003; Kessler, 2001).

Legislative Action. Legislative action provides public health advocates with the opportunity to suggest laws and regulations they believe will better protect public health. Health organizations and their allies haveworked to persuade lawmakers to raise taxes or end tax breaks on tobacco, alcohol, junk food, and fuel-inefficient cars to discourage their use (Hakim, 2004; Nicholl, 1998; Stivers, 1994); to set standards for production and advertising of health-damaging products (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003); to modify zoning or land use laws to reduce access to tobacco, alcohol, or fast food (Ashe, Jernigan, Kline, & Galaz, 2003); to restrict use of tobacco, guns, or alcohol by certain populations or in certain places (Hemenway, 2004; Rabin & Sugarman, 2001); to mandate disclosure of product dangers (Kessler, 2001); and to fund health education to alert the public to hazards (Glantz & Balbach, 2002). To achieve these legislative objectives, advocacy groups have educated citizens and policy makers, lobbied, used the media, organized demonstrations and rallies, and formed coalitions.

Electoral Activities. Electoral activities take the action to the voting booth. In several recent local, state, and national elections, supporters and opponents of tobacco and gun control endorsed candidates, contributed money, and campaigned for politicians who supported their cause (DeMarco & Schneider, 2000; Zakocs, Earp, & Runyan, 2001). In some states, ballot initiatives and referenda provide another opportunity to take health issues to the voters. In California, for example, statewide or local tobacco control advocates used ballot initiatives or propositions to bring tobacco policy to the voters throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Glantz & Balbach, 2002).

Litigation. Litigation enables advocates to bring to court corporations alleged to have harmed health. Judges can order an end to dangerous practices, award compensatory or punitive damages, and set a precedent that will apply in other jurisdictions. In recent years, activists have taken each of the six industries reviewed here to court based on the health consequences of their actions. Several recent review articles have summarized the accomplishments and limitations of litigation as a public health strategy (Jacobson & Soliman, 2002; Parmet & Daynard, 2000; Pearson, 1997).

Actions Aimed at Corporations. Actions aimed at corporations provide advocates the opportunity to bring their messages directly to corporate directors or shareholders. In their campaigns to change howthe multinational Nestle Corporation marketed infant formula in developing nations, activists organized aworldwide boycott that has been periodically reinstated during the past 3 decades (Nestle, 2002, pp. 145-158). In the state of Washington, some activists have proposed revoking the corporate charters issued by the state for companies that repeatedly violate the law (Parrish, 1999). Investors have also become more active. By 2000, more than a trillion dollars was invested in U.S.-managed portfolios that used some social investment strategy, a thirtyfold increase from 1984 (Hertz, 2001, p. 122). Shareholder activism has, for example, forced 3M,America’s third largest billboard company, to end tobacco advertising on its billboards, and Kimberly Clark to sell its holdings in tobacco companies (Hertz, 2001, p. 124).

Education, Information, and Mobilization Campaigns. Education, information, and mobilization campaigns often constitute the foundation for other strategies and also serve to put an issue on the public agenda. Health advocates seeking to change corporate behavior have used counteradvertising campaigns against SUVs, tobacco, and alcohol (Agostinelli & Grube, 2002; Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Hakim, 2003); media advocacy to influence public opinion on alcohol, guns, and food advertising aimed at children (Holder &Treno, 1997;Wallack, Dorfman, Jernigan,&Themba, 1993); and community organizing to mobilize constituencies to support access to lower priced pharmaceutical products in other countries (American Association of Retired Persons, 2004). As Dorfman et al.
(2005) note, these strategies play an important role in framing conflicts between public health advocates and corporations and thus influence the outcome of these interactions.

In the past few decades, health professionals, advocates, and their supporters have accumulated an impressive body of experience using these strategies to influence corporate practices and policies. Each strategy has elicited counteractions by the corporate targets, and thus, strategies and tactics on both sides of these conflicts have changed continually. Systematic research is needed to identify the relative benefits and costs of these strategies and the circumstances that contribute to successful efforts to reduce the promotion of diseases.

The Outcomes

Although a comprehensive assessment of the efficacy of these strategies is beyond the scope of this report and perhaps premature, available evidence suggests that public health advocacy to change corporate practices has the potential to contribute to improved health. A few examples illustrate the range of achievements.

In some cases, environmental regulations can be remarkably effective in reducing threats to health. Between 1968 and 1983, for example, primarily as a result of new clean air standards advocated by the environmental movement, American automobile air pollution, which contributes to lung and heart disease, was reduced by 90% (Yates, 1983). Similarly, federal mandates for automobile seatbelts and air bags, long opposed by the auto industry (Doyle, 2000), are now credited with saving thousands of lives because consumer advocates persuaded Congress to require these devices (Martin, Crandall, & Pilkey, 2000).

In California, an aggressive tobacco control program that targeted both industry practices and individuals is estimated to have reduced tobacco consumption by 75% in 10 years, a much larger reduction than in states without such programs (Glantz & Balbach, 2002, p. 5). A recent study found that following a local law banning smoking in public places and in the workplace in Helena, Montana, the number of monthly admissions for acute myocardial infarction from the city but not from areas where the ban was not in effect dropped significantly (Sargent, Shepard,&Glantz, 2004), suggesting that changes in the law may be able to produce even short-term benefits.

In Washington, D.C., a lawbanning the purchase, sale, transfer, or possession of handguns by civilians was associated with a prompt decline in homicides and suicides in the city but not in adjoining areas without such bans (Loftin, McDowall, Wiersema, & Cottey, 1991). More recently, the threat of ongoing litigation led Colt Industries to decide to abandon much of its retail gun business and focus instead on producing for the military and police (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003, p. 141), a clear example of pressure leading to changes in corporate practices.


To evaluate the overall health impact of campaigns to change corporate behavior and to develop guidelines for effective practice will require a more systematic approach to this phenomena and a more standardized body of literature. Some of the research questions that emerged from this review include the following:

1. What is the impact of corporate characteristics, such as the position of a company within its industry, the unique corporate culture, current profit levels, competitiveness within the industry, and its influence within the political arena, on a corporation’s policies and practices related to health? Under what circumstances do market forces lead to reductions in health-damaging practices?

2. What are the potentials and limitations of health advocacy campaigns at different levels and within different branches of the government? What shapes a particular government agency’s responsiveness to corporate versus health advocacy demands? Under what political and economic conditions are governments likely to support or oppose public health campaigns to change corporate behavior? What are the unique opportunities and constraints for change in different phases of economic, budget, and electoral cycles?

3. What frames best enable public health advocates to win public support for their goals? What are the relative advantages, disadvantages, and efficacy of the various strategies for changing corporate behavior? What is the relative efficacy of different types of advocacy coalitions or networks in changing corporate practices?

4. What are the specific social and behavioral processes by which corporate practices and policies damage health? What are the specific social and behavioral processes by which public health advocacy campaigns can mitigate or reverse these adverse health outcomes?

5. To what extent does corporate disease promotion contribute to or exacerbate disparities in health among different socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic groups? Do campaigns to change corporate behavior offer a way to reduce these inequities?

Designing studies to answer these questions constitutes a research agenda on disease promotion
and advocacy to change corporate practices that can guide future intervention.

A focus on corporate practices also challenges health educators to reconsider the theoretical paradigms that have guided our work. For many years, the dominant paradigm in health education has been that individual behavior and lifestyle are the primary determinants of population health in the United States (Fuchs, 1998; Knowles, 1977; McGinnis &Foege, 1993). Critics have long challenged this perspective (Freudenberg, 1978; Israel et al., 1995; Minkler, 1989), and a more recent synthesis is that policy also has an important influence on health and that public health interventions should seek to change individuals, organizations, and policies (Caraher & Coveney, 2004; Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 21st Century, 2003; Green & Kreuter, 2005; Melkote, Muppidi, & Goswami, 2000). Despite this emerging scientific consensus, the vast majority of public health interventions still target only individual behavior, and few organized interventions have made meaningful and sustained efforts to change policy at a level that could influence population health (Bowen&Beresford, 2002; Freudenberg et al., 2000).

This focus on public health advocacy to change corporate practices also offers an opportunity to revise the dominant paradigm. If etiologic research confirms that corporate policies have a substantial impact on morbidity and mortality here in the United States and globally, modifying these behaviors takes on a new imperative. If evaluation research demonstrates that the intervention strategies described here successfully modify corporate behavior enough to reduce adverse health consequences, then public health professionals need to master the competencies needed to develop and sustain such interventions.

What does all this have to with health education? In 1986, the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (First International Conference on Health Promotion, 1986) defined health promotion as “the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve their health” (p. 1). More than any other single profession, health educators have as their central task educating and mobilizing individuals, organizations, and communities to promote health. Public health advocacy to change health-damaging corporate practices has emerged as a promising strategy for health promotion.Areviewof accounts of these advocacy campaigns shows that many of the core tasks in these efforts closely
parallel professional descriptions of health education competencies: framing public health issues, mobilizing community and institutional resources, educating the public, identifying political opportunities for action, building coalitions, and evaluating success. Similarly, the implicit or explicit rationales for these campaigns often rely on the same theoretical literatures that health educators use: theories on social movements, organizational and behavioral change, communications, ecological models, and empowerment (Glanz, Rimer, & Lewis, 2003; Green & Kreuter, 2005). These parallels between health education and health advocacy suggest that health educators already have some of the competencies needed to play leadership and supporting roles in these campaigns.

At the same time, advocacy to change corporate practices will require new competencies and perspectives. First, transferring the focus from changing the behavior of individuals to one that includes modifying corporate or government action will necessitate ideological as well as skills transformation. A starting point is to examine to what extent existing theories, such as the health belief model or social learning theories (Glanz et al., 2003), can also help predict and then change institutional behavior. Second, current health education practice relies heavily on cooperative and consensus-building strategies, based on the liberal assumption that people of goodwill can come together and agree on compromises. Recent advocacy campaigns to change corporate practices, however, have often used adversarial strategies, borrowing more from social movements and contentious politics (Tarrow et al., 1998) than from small group or social marketing theories. As Kreuter (2005) notes, power is the language that corporations speak and understand best. To prepare health educators with the skills to analyze power dynamics and the stomach and backbone for political conflict that advocacy campaigns against multinational corporations may require, training programs will need to modify their curricula.

Some health educators will raise understandable objections to an expansion of our practice to include advocacy to change corporate behavior. Some will contest the epidemiological evidence, asserting that the proximate role of individual behavior in current patterns of morbidity and mortality makes it the logical focus of health education efforts, not the more distant corporate policies. Others may agree that corporate practices play an important role but argue that changing such behaviors is too difficult or too risky, jeopardizing funding from government or corporate sources. Another point of view is that health educators should remain neutral rather than participate in social conflicts (e.g., debates on the appropriate roles for the government and markets in our society), maintaining
an objective, fair, and balanced stance. These concerns get to the heart of our definition of the role of health educators. Any expansion of health education practice to encompass health advocacy to change corporate behavior will require open and honest dialogue on these and related scientific, ethical, and professional questions.

Supporters of an expanded role for health education practice offer philosophical and pragmatic responses to their colleagues’concerns. First, they argue that public health and health education have always taken on special interests that harm health. Founders of modern U.S. public health, such as Alice Hamilton, C. E. Winslow, Margaret Sanger, Jane Adams, Mayhew Derryberry, and others (Rosen, 1993), tackled the employers, producers, landlords, and medical institutions that sometimes acted against the well-being of the public. Recently, the CDC (1999) identified the 10 greatest accomplishments of U.S. public health in the 20th century. Four of these—improving motor vehicle safety, making workplaces safer, producing safer and healthier foods, and recognizing tobacco as a
health hazard—involved modifying corporate practices that damaged health. Thus, say the supporters, advocacy to change corporate practice is not a new strategy but a return to our public health roots.

Second, borrowing from critics of the concept of scientific objectivity (Parsons, 2003), advocates argue that neutrality is a chimera and often serves to support the status quo by refusing to challenge those with the most power. Expecting health professionals to view the claims of the tobacco industry, for example, with equal credibility as those of public health researchers or advocates of tobacco control defies common sense and a 50-year historical record of deception (Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Kluger, 1997).

Supporters of advocacy campaigns to change corporate practices also reject the claim that the public opposes such action. They point to public opinion polls that show strong support for gun control, restricting tobacco advertising, strong public oversight of the drug industry, regulating pollution, and holding the food industry accountable for its role in the obesity epidemic (Batra, Patkar, Weibel, Pincock, & Leone, 2002; Nestle, 2003; Vernick, Teret, Howard, Teret, & Wintemute, 1993).

Finally, supporters of confronting disease promoters raise a moral imperative. If the mission of health educators is to promote health and the evidence shows that specific actions by corporations damage health, then there is a professional and moral obligation to act to reduce the harm. Failing to pursue promising strategies, they argue, violates ethical standards.

Recent events suggest that both the corporate quest for greater profits and less regulations and advocacy group efforts to modify corporate practices to better protect public health will continue. Public health professionals, including health educators, will need to decide how best to relate to these conflicts. By focusing attention on this emerging domain and by systematically assessing the potential for advocacy to change corporate practices to promote health, we can make informed choices about our future roles.

References [see PDF]

Tracking the Effects of Corporate Practices on Health